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Abstract
We study the Fisher model of a competitive market from the algorithmic perspective.
For that, the related convex optimization problem due to Gale and Eisenberg, [8], is used.
The latter problem is known to yield a Fisher equilibrium under some structural assump-
tions on consumers' utilities, e.g. homogeneity of degree 1, homotheticity etc. Our goal
is to examine the applicability of the convex optimization framework by departing from
these traditional assumptions. We just assume the concavity of consumers' utility func-
tions. For this case we suggest a novel concept of Fisher-Gale equilibrium by introducing
consumers' utility prices. The prices of utility transfer the utility of a consumption bundle
to a common numeraire. We develop a subgradient-type algorithm from Convex Analysis
to compute a Fisher-Gale equilibrium. In order to decentralize prices, we additionally im-
plement the auction design, i.e. consumers settle and update their individual prices and
producers sell at the highest oer price. Our price adjustment is based on a ta^tonnement
procedure, i.e. the prices change proportionally to consumers' individual excess supplies.
Historical averages of consumption are shown to clear the market of goods. Our algorithm
enjoys a convergence rate. In worst case, the number of price updates needed to achieve
the "-tolerance is proportional to 1
"2
.
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convex optimization, subgradient methods, decentralization of prices, auction
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1 Introduction
The concept of Fisher equilibrium for a competitive market dates back to 1891, see e.g.
[1]. Due to Fisher's model, consumers buy goods by spending given wealths in order to
maximize their utility functions. There are xed amounts of supplied goods available
at the market. Fisher equilibrium comprises of optimal consumption bundles and equi-
librium prices which clear the market of goods. Aiming at the ecient computation of
a Fisher equilibrium, a related convex optimization problem has been proposed in [8].
This so-called Gale's problem consists of maximizing an aggregated logarithmic utility
function subject to market feasibility constraints. The feasibility constraints ensure that
the aggregated consumption does not exceed the xed amounts of supplied goods. The
solutions of Gale's problem give equilibrium allocations for the Fisher market. Moreover,
the Lagrange or dual multipliers for its feasibility constraints yield equilibrium prices. It
is crucial to point out that the solutions of Gale's problem provide Fisher equilibrium
mainly if the wealths are fully spent within the budget constraints. To guarantee the lat-
ter fact some structural assumptions on the consumers' utility functions have been made
in the literature. In [8] the case of linear utility functions for Fisher market has been
considered. Later, the Gale's approach has been extended for concave and homogeneous
utility functions of degree 1 in [9]. The convex optimization framework has been applied
in [13] in order to handle homothetic and quasi-concave utilities. Recently in [2], the par-
ticular case of concave and non-homogeneous utility functions in potential or logarithmic
form has been successively studied.
The goal of the present paper is to examine the applicability of the Gale's approach by
departing from the structural assumptions on the consumers' utilities. In what follows,
we just assume the concavity of consumers' utility functions. In case of general concave
utility functions, we cannot guarantee the full spending of wealths within the budget
constraints. This is the main reason why under our concavity assumption the concepts of
Fisher and Gale equilibrium may come apart. To deal with this diculty, we generalize
both concepts of Fisher and Gale equilibrium by introducing the so-called utility prices
attributed to consumers. Prices of utility allow to dynamically transfer the utility of a
consumption bundle to a common numeraire. Using this transferable utility, we introduce
a novel concept of Fisher-Gale equilibrium. Here, consumers maximize their revenues
as the dierences of transferred utilities and expenditures expressed in a numeraire (see
Denition 3 for details). It turns out that Fisher and Gale equilibria can be viewed
as Fisher-Gale equilibrium (see Theorem 1). In particular, for Fisher equilibrium the
utility prices are inverse Lagrange multipliers associated to budget constraints. For Gale
equilibrium, the utility prices appear as ratios of wealths to achieved utilities. The latter
gives rise to the ecient computation of a Fisher-Gale equilibrium by following the Gale's
approach. We revise some previous attempts to solve the Gale's convex optimization
problem known in the literature. Already in [11] the ellipsoid method has been applied
for that. In [7], a polynomial time algorithm based on a primal-dual scheme has been
proposed to tackle the Gale's problem. An interior-point method for Gale's problem is
developed in [26]. For an algorithm based on the excess demand function we refer to
[4]. An auction-based algorithm for Fisher model has been suggested in [12]. In [10],
a decentralized algorithm with the ta^tonnement price adjustment has been constructed
using the indirect utility functions. We also mention [16] where a simultaneous ascending
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auction is used to construct a decentralized price adjustment. For comprehensive surveys
on the computational issues of economic equilibria see [6, 24].
In this paper we develop a subgradient-type algorithm to compute a Fisher-Gale equi-
librium by Gale's approach. Its convergence properties are crucially based on Convex
Analysis. The price adjustment corresponds to the quasi-monotone subgradent method
for nonsmooth convex minimization, recently suggested in [18]. As objective function
for the latter method we take the total logarithmic revenue of the market. Equilibrium
prices can be then characterized as its minimizers. In order to decentralize prices, we
additionally implement the auction design:
consumers settle and update their individual prices,
and producers sell at the highest oer price.
It is crucial for our approach that the introduction of the auction design preserves convex-
ity of the total logarithmic revenue. Moreover, its convex subgradients w.r.t. a consumer's
price become his individual excess supplies, which are easily observable. This is used by
consumers to successively update prices by themselves rather than by relying on a central
authority. Our price adjustment is based on a ta^tonnement procedure, i.e. the prices
change proportionally to consumers' individual excess supplies. While our algorithm pro-
ceeds, the market clearance is achieved on average. The latter means that during the price
adjustment supply meets demand statistically. In mathematical terms, average consump-
tion bundles approach the solution of the Gale's (or adjoint) problem for the minimization
of the total logarithmic revenue. Altogether, the sequence of highest oer prices, histor-
ical averages of consumption bundles and historical averages of utility prices generated
by our algorithm, converges to a Fisher-Gale equilibrium (see Theorem 5). Moreover,
our algorithm is able to guarantee a convergence rate of this process. In worst case, the
number of price updates needed to achieve the "-tolerance is proportional to 1
"2
. Note
that this rate of convergence is optimal for nonsmooth convex minimization, cf. [17].
From the economic perspective, this result explains why competitive markets adjust in
ecient way, moreover, it quanties the worst-case eciency. Note that the relatively low
accuracy of price adjustment processes usually suces for markets. Consequently, our
complexity result of 1
"2
is quite reasonable.
The article is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce and discuss the concept
of Fisher-Gale equilibrium. In Section 3 we describe the decentralization of prices by
the auction. We prove the convergence of our decentralized subgradient-type algorithm
toward a Fisher-Gale equilibrium in Section 4. Appendix is devoted to the mathematical
justication of quasi-monotone subgradient schemes.
Notation. Our notation is quite standard. We denote by Rn the space of n-
dimensional column vectors x = (x(1); : : : ; x(n))T , and by Rn+ the set of all vectors with
nonnegative components. R++ stand for the set of positive real numbers. For x and y
from Rn, we introduce the standard scalar product and the Hadamard product
hx; yi =
nX
i=1
x(i)y(i); x  y =

x(i)y(i)
n
i=1
2 Rn:
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For the vectors p1; : : : ; pI 2 Rn, we denote by max
i=1;:::;I
pi 2 Rn the vector with coordinates

max
i=1;:::;I
pi
(j)
= max
i=1;:::;I
p
(j)
i ; j = 1; : : : ; n:
2 Fisher-Gale equilibrium
We start with the classical concept of Fisher equilibrium, see e.g. [1]. Consider a market
with I consumers, which are able to buy n divisible goods. The i-th consumer has to decide
on the consumption bundle xi 2 Xi, where the consumption set Xi  Rn+ is assumed to be
nonempty and convex. Given a vector of prices p 2 Rn+, the i-th consumer maximizes the
concave utility function ui : Rn+ ! R++ with respect to the so-called budget constraint.
The latter says that the acquired consumption bundle cannot cost more than the available
wealth wi 2 R+ of the i-th consumer. On the production side of the market there are
xed amounts of supplied goods as given by the vector e 2 Rn+. Finally, equilibrium prices
ensure the market clearing condition, i.e. the aggregate consumption never exceeds the
available amounts of supplied goods, and the markets of goods with positive prices are
perfectly cleared.
Denition 1 (Fisher equilibrium, [1]) The vector of prices and consumption bundles
p; (xi )
I
i=1

is called Fisher equilibrium, if
(i) consumers maximize utilities w.r.t. budget constraints, i.e.
xi 2 arg max
xi 2 Xi
hp; xii  wi
ui(xi); i = 1; : : : ; I; (1)
(ii) the market clearing condition holds, i.e.
p  0; e 
IX
i=1
xi  0;
*
p; e 
IX
i=1
xi
+
= 0: (2)
In order to compute Fisher equilibrium, the following convex optimization problem
has been proposed in [8, 11]:
max
xi 2 Xi
i = 1; : : : ; I
IX
i=1
wi lnui(xi) such that
IX
i=1
xi  e: (3)
The objective function in (3) may be viewed as a socially aggregated utility, i.e. the sum
of consumers' wealths assessed by logarithmic utility factors. The feasibility constraint
in (3) means that the aggregate consumption never exceeds the available amounts of
supplied goods. Market prices appear naturally as Lagrange multipliers for the feasibility
constraint. Indeed, due to the duality of convex optimization, we obtain for (3):
max
xi 2 Xi
i = 1; : : : ; I
min
p0
IX
i=1
wi lnui(xi) +
*
p; e 
IX
i=1
xi
+
=
3
min
p0
IX
i=1
max
xi 2 Xi
wi lnui(xi)  hp; xii+ hp; ei :
The latter saddle-point problem can be interpreted economically as follows. Given the
vector of prices p 2 Rn+, the i-th consumer maximizes his logarithmic revenue, i.e. he
solves
LRi(p)
def
= max
xi 2 Xi
wi lnui(xi)  hp; xii : (4)
Here, the logarithmic revenue is given as the dierence between i-th consumer's log-
arithmically assessed wealth and his expenditures. Finally, the equilibrium prices are
characterized by minimizing the total logarithmic revenue of consumers and producers:
TLR(p)
def
=
IX
i=1
LRi(p) + hp; ei :
Motivated by the forgoing discussion we dene
Denition 2 (Gale equilibrium, [8, 11]) The vector of prices and consumption bun-
dles

p; (xi )
I
i=1

is called Gale equilibrium, if it solves the saddle point problem
min
p0
IX
i=1
max
xi 2 Xi
wi lnui(xi)  hp; xii+ hp; ei :
Namely,
(i) consumers maximize logarithmic revenues, i.e.
xi 2 arg max
xi 2 Xi
wi lnui(xi)  hp; xii ; i = 1; : : : ; I; (5)
(ii) the market clearing condition holds, i.e.
p  0; e 
IX
i=1
xi  0;
*
p; e 
IX
i=1
xi
+
= 0: (6)
It is well-known in the literature under which conditions the concepts of Fisher and
Gale equilibrium coincide. In case of Xi = Rn+ and linear utility functions ui(), i =
1; : : : ; I, the equivalence of Fisher and Gale equilibrium has served as a starting point
for the seminal paper [8]. In [9], the equivalence result has been generalized for concave
and homogeneous utility functions of degree 1. The convex optimization framework (3)
has been applied in [13] in order to handle homothetic and quasi-concave utilities. Re-
cently in [2], the case of concave and non-homogeneous utility functions in potential or
logarithmic form has been successively tackled. It is worth to mention that the equiva-
lence of Fisher and Gale concepts crucially relies on the full spending of wealths within
the budget constraints. It turns out that the structural assumptions on the utilities pro-
vide the latter fact. The goal of the present paper is to examine the applicability of the
convex optimization approach (3) by departing from the structural assumptions on the
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consumers' utilities. We merely assume that the utility functions ui(), i = 1; : : : ; I, are
concave. Moreover, as a novelty we introduce general compact consumption sets Xi with
0 2 Xi, i = 1; : : : ; I rather than Xi = Rn+ as in the previous literature. The compactness
assumption on Xi refers to the fact that the consumption is bounded. Naturally, there are
physical limits to what people can consume in order to satisfy their needs. The bounded
consumption can also be justied by ecological reasons. The unbounded desire for wealth
is not an issue here, since the wealth wi is a primitive in Fisher's model (confer the discus-
sion on this assumption in [22]). In case of general concave utility functions and compact
consumption sets, we cannot guarantee the full spending of wealths within the budget
constraints. This is the main reason why under our assumptions the concepts of Fisher
and Gale equilibrium need not to coincide in general. To overcome this diculty, we
generalize both concepts of Fisher and Gale equilibria by introducing the so-called utility
prices qi 2 (0;1] attributed to the i-th consumer. Prices of utility qi allow to dynamically
transfer the utility ui(xi) of a consumption bundle xi to a common numeraire by qiui(xi).
For the discussion on the concept of transferable utility we refer e.g. to [15].
Denition 3 (Fisher-Gale equilibrium) The vector of prices, consumption bundles,
and utility prices

p; (xi )
I
i=1 ; (q

i )
I
i=1

is called Fisher-Gale equilibrium, if
(i) consumers maximize revenues fullling budget constraints, i.e.
xi 2 arg max
xi 2 Xi
qi ui(xi)  hp; xii ; and hp; xi i  wi; i = 1; : : : ; I; (7)
(ii) the market clearing condition holds, i.e.
p  0; e 
IX
i=1
xi  0;
*
p; e 
IX
i=1
xi
+
= 0: (8)
Note that the utility price qi =1 in (7) means that xi 2 arg max
xi 2 Xi
ui(xi).
Next Theorem 1 shows that equilibria due to Fisher and Gale are particular cases of
Fisher-Gale equilibrium. For Fisher equilibrium the utility prices arise as inverse values
of Lagrange multipliers associated to budget constraints. For Gale equilibrium the utility
prices can be found as ratios of wealths to achieved utility values.
Theorem 1
(a) If

p; (xi )
I
i=1

is a Fisher equilibrium with Lagrange multipliers i associated to
budget constraints in (1), then
 
p; (xi )
I
i=1 ;

1
i
I
i=1
!
is a Fisher-Gale equilibrium.
(b) If

p; (xi )
I
i=1

is a Gale equilibrium, then
 
p; (xi )
I
i=1 ;

wi
ui (xi )
I
i=1
!
is a Fisher-
Gale equilibrium.
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Proof:
(a) Let

p; (xi )
I
i=1

be a Fisher equilibrium according to Denition 1. Optimality con-
ditions for (1) read
hrui(xi )  i p; xi   yii  0 for all yi 2 Xi; (9)
i  0; hp; xi i  wi; i (wi   hp; xi i) = 0;
Due to concavity of utility functions ui(), i = 1; : : : ; I, we have
hrui(xi ); xi   yii  ui(xi )  ui(yi) for all yi 2 Xi: (10)
Together with (9) we obtain
ui(x

i )  ui(yi)  i hp; xi   yii  0 for all yi 2 Xi;
thus, if i 6= 0,
1
i
ui(x

i )  hp; xi i 
1
i
ui(yi)  hp; yii  0 for all yi 2 Xi:
If i = 0, then the utility price is formally set to
1
i
=1, and
ui(x

i )  ui(yi) for all yi 2 Xi:
(b) Let

p; (xi )
I
i=1

be a Gale equilibrium according to Denition 2. Optimality condi-
tions for (5) read 
wi
ui (xi )
rui(xi )  p; xi   yi

 0 for all yi 2 Xi; (11)
Again using (10), we obtain
wi
ui (xi )
ui(x

i )  hp; xi i 
wi
ui (xi )
ui(yi)  hp; yii for all yi 2 Xi:
Moreover, setting yi = 0 in (11) and in (10), we have
hp; xi i  wi
hrui(xi ); xi i
ui (xi )
 wiui(x

i )  ui(0)
ui (xi )
 wi:
Overall, the assertions (a) and (b) follow. 2
The proof of Theorem 1 (b) provides yet another economic interpretation for the
maximization of the i-th consumer's logarithmic revenue (4). In fact, let
xi 2 arg max
xi 2 Xi
wi lnui(xi)  hp; xii ; (12)
for a xed vector of prices p 2 Rn+. As we have seen above, such consumption bundle xi
 satises the budget constraint, i.e. hp; xii  wi,
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 maximizes revenue with the utility price qi = wiui(xi) , i.e.
qiui(xi)  hp; xii  qiui(yi)  hp; yii for all yi 2 Xi: (13)
In accordance with this interpretation, we always associate the utility price qi =
wi
ui(xi)
with
the consumption bundle xi. Moreover, in what follows we assume that the i-th consumer
is able to compute an optimal consumption bundle xi as from (12). Note that there is
evidence from behavioral economics that consumer's choices need not be consistent with
the maximization of a preference relation (see [14] and references therein). The reason for
that is usually referred to as consumers' bounded rationality. Classic examples include
status-quo biases, attraction, compromise and framing eects, temptation and self-control,
consideration sets, and choice overload. Within our approach, the consumption based on
the maximization of the logarithmic revenue is consistent with the concept of transferable
utility (cf. also [3]).
3 Auction design
Theorem 1 (b) suggests that for nding a Fisher-Gale equilibrium we may solve the
following saddle point problem:
min
p0
IX
i=1
max
xi 2 Xi
wi lnui(xi)  hp; xii+ hp; ei :
First, we concentrate on the Fisher-Gale equilibrium prices as minimizers of the total
logarithmic revenue
TLR def= min
p2Rn+
TLR(p); (P)
where
TLR(p) =
IX
i=1
LRi(p) + hp; ei ; LRi(p) = max
xi 2 Xi
wi lnui(xi)  hp; xii :
Our goal is to explain how agents can eciently tackle this nonsmooth convex minimiza-
tion problem (P) by successively updating prices. It is crucial for our approach that the
updates of prices correspond to subgradient-type schemes for solving (P).
Theorem 2 (Subdierential of TLR) For p 2 Rn+ it holds:
@TLR(p) = e 
IX
i=1
arg max
xi 2 Xi
wi lnui(xi)  hp; xii :
Proof:
We apply [20, Theorem 23.8] on the subdierential of the sum of convex functions in order
to obtain
@TLR(p) = e 
IX
i=1
@LRi(p):
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Due to [25, Theorem 2.4.18] on the convex subdierential of a max-type function, we also
have
@LRi(p) =  arg max
xi 2 Xi
wi lnui(xi)  hp; xii ; i = 1; : : : ; I:
Overall, the assertion follows. 2
Due to Theorem 2, the subgradients of TLR represent the excess supply, i.e.
rTLR(p) = e 
IX
i=1
xi 2 @TLR(p); (14)
where xi 2 argmax xi 2 Xi wi lnui(xi)   hp; xii. This gives rise to use the subgradients
rTLR(p) for the iterative minimization of TLR. E.g., the change of prices p can be
taken proportional to the current excess demand:
p   rTLR(p):
However, as it can be seen from (14), the subgradients of TLR are not known to con-
sumers. Indeed, rTLR(p) represents the aggregate excess supply. For getting access
to its value, one would assume the existence of a manager who collects the information
about all consumption bundles, and aggregates them over the whole market. Here, the
full information about consumption over the market must be available to him. Besides,
the prices need to be updated by the manager, thus, leading to price regulation. Clearly,
these assumptions can be justied only within a centrally planned economy. Aiming to
avoid this restriction, we decentralize prices.
The decentralization of prices can be implemented by the introduction of the auction
design:
i-th consumer settles and updates his individual prices pi,
and producers sell at the highest oer price max
i=1;:::;I
pi.
Note that for vectors p1; : : : ; pI 2 Rn, we denote by max
i=1;:::;I
pi 2 Rn the vector with
coordinates 
max
i=1;:::;I
pi
(j)
= max
i=1;:::;I
p
(j)
i ; j = 1; : : : ; n:
Now, the total logarithmic revenue depends on the consumers' prices (pi)
I
i=1 as follows:
TLR(p1; : : : ; pI)
def
=
IX
i=1
LRi (pi) +

max
i=1;:::;I
pi; e

=
IX
i=1
max
xi 2 Xi
wi lnui(xi)  hpi; xii+

max
i=1;:::;I
pi; e

: (15)
The decentralization of prices makes the corresponding subdierential information about
excess demands available to consumers. In fact, note that the total logarithmic revenue
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TLR from (15) is convex in the variables (pi)
I
i=1. Let us obtain an expression for its
convex subgradients rpiTLR(p1; : : : ; pI) w.r.t. pi:
rpiTLR(p1; : : : ; pI) = i  e  xi; i = 1; : : : ; I: (16)
Here, xi 2 arg max
xi 2 Xi
wi lnui(xi)   hpi; xii is the demand of i-th consumer w.r.t. his
individual price pi. Further, 
(j)
i denotes the share of producers' supply e to i-th consumer
for good j. Indeed, the shares 
(j)
i for good j sum up to 1 over all consumers i = 1; : : : ; I.
Moreover, the share 
(j)
i vanishes if the i-th consumer's price p
(j)
i is less than the highest
oer price max
i=1;:::;I
p
(j)
i for good j.
Thus, we write
(i)
I
i=1 2M (p1; : : : ; pI) ;
where
M (p1; : : : ; pI)
def
=
8>>>><>>>>:(i)
I
i=1 2 [0; 1]nI

IX
i=1

(j)
i = 1;

(j)
i = 0 if p
(j)
i 6= max
i=1;:::;I
p
(j)
i
j = 1; : : : ; n; i = 1; : : : ; I
9>>>>=>>>>; :
We claim that the subdierential information in (16) is known to i-th consumer. First,
note that xi is his consumption bundle. Despite of the fact that the shares i and the
supplies e cannot be estimated by i-th consumer, their product i e is perfectly available
to him. Indeed, i  e forms the bundle of goods supplied by producers to i-th consumer.
Altogether, the subgradients rpiTLR(p1; : : : ; pI) represent the individual excess of i-th
consumer's supply over his demands. Overall, we obtain:
Theorem 3 (Producers' excess supply and TLR)
@piTLR(p1; : : : ; pI) = i  e  arg max
xi 2 Xi
wi lnui(xi)  hpi; xii ; i = 1; : : : ; I;
with demand shares (i)
I
i=1 2M (p1; : : : ; pI) :
Due to Theorem 3, the subdierential of TLR(p1; : : : ; pI) is completely available to
i-th consumer. This fact suggests to adjust prices by solving the minimization problem
min
p1;:::;pI2Rn+
TLR(p1; : : : ; pI): (PD)
Note that the minimization problem (PD) is stated w.r.t. the decentralized consumers'
prices (pi)
I
i=1, while previously in (P) one minimizes over the common prices p.
We relate the minimization problems (P) and (PD) by exploiting the fact that they
have the same adjoint problem (3):
max
xi 2 Xi
i = 1; : : : ; I
(
(x1; : : : ; xI)

IX
i=1
xi  e
)
; (A)
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where
 (x1; : : : ; xI)
def
=
IX
i=1
wi lnui(xi):
In (A) the central authority assigns consumption bundles by maximizing the logarithmic
welfare of the society and by ensuring the market feasibility. In order to state (A), the
central authority needs to know agents' utility functions, consumption sets, etc. Obvi-
ously, this information about the consumers is hardly observable to the central authority.
Consequently, it cannot be justied in general that the welfare maximization problem is
tackled directly. Nevertheless, note that the prices of goods play the role of Lagrange or
dual multipliers for the market feasibility constraint
IX
i=1
xi  e:
Confer already [11, 21] for similar interpretations.
In order to prove that (A) is the adjoint problem not only for (P), but also for (PD),
we need the following simple Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 For xi; e 2 Rn+, i = 1; : : : ; I, the inequality
IX
i=1
xi  e (17)
is equivalent to
IX
i=1
hpi; xii 

max
i=1;:::;I
pi; e

for all pi 2 Rn+; i = 1; : : : ; I: (18)
Proof:
(i) Let (17) be satised. For pi 2 Rn+, i = 1; : : : ; I, we have
IX
i=1
hpi; xii  

max
i=1;:::;I
pi; e

=
nX
j=1
 
IX
i=1
p
(j)
i x
(j)
i   max
i=1;:::;I
p
(j)
i e
(j)
!
:
For (18) to hold, it is sucient to show that
IX
i=1
p
(j)
i x
(j)
i   max
i=1;:::;I
p
(j)
i e
(j)  0 for all j = 1; : : : ; n:
Indeed, setting for xed j 2 f1; : : : ; ng
p(j) = max
i=1;:::;I
p
(j)
i and I(j) =
n
i 2 f1; : : : ; Ig
 p(j)i = p(j)o ; (19)
we obtain:
IX
i=1
p
(j)
i x
(j)
i   max
i=1;:::;I
p
(j)
i e
(j) =
X
i2I(j)
p(j)x
(j)
i +
X
i 62I(j)
p
(j)
i x
(j)
i   p(j)e(j) =
10
=
X
i2I(j)
p(j)x
(j)
i +
X
i62I(j)
p
(j)
i x
(j)
i   p(j)e(j) +
X
i62I(j)
p(j)x
(j)
i  
X
i62I(j)
p(j)x
(j)
i
= p(j)
 
IX
i=1
x
(j)
i   e(j)
!
+
X
i62I(j)

p
(j)
i   p(j)

x
(j)
i :
The last expression is nonpositive due to (17), (19), and p(j); x
(j)
i 2 R+, i = 1; : : : ; I.
(ii) Let (18) be satised. Setting there pi = p 2 Rn+, we get*
p;
IX
i=1
xi
+
 hp; ei for all p 2 Rn+:
Hence, (17) is fullled. 2
Theorem 4 It holds:
min
p2Rn+
TLR(p) = min
p1;:::;pI2Rn+
TLR(p1; : : : ; pI)
= max
xi 2 Xi
i = 1; : : : ; I
(
(x1; : : : ; xI)

IX
i=1
xi  e
)
:
Proof:
TLR(p1; : : : ; pI) = max
xi 2 Xi
i = 1; : : : ; I
(x1; : : : ; xI) 
IX
i=1
hpi; xii+

max
i=1;:::;I
pi; e

: (20)
Using this representation (20) of TLR(p1; : : : ; pI), we obtain:
min
p1;:::;pI2Rn+
TLR(p1; : : : ; pI) =
= min
p1;:::;pI2Rn+
max
xi 2 Xi
i = 1; : : : ; I
 (x1; : : : ; xI) 
IX
i=1
hpi; xii+

max
i=1;:::;I
pi; e

= max
xi 2 Xi
i = 1; : : : ; I
(x1; : : : ; xI) + min
p1;:::;pI2Rn+
 
IX
i=1
hpi; xii+

max
i=1;:::;I
pi; e

(21)
= max
xi 2 Xi
i = 1; : : : ; I
8><>:(x1; : : : ; xI)

IX
i=1
hpi; xii 

max
i=1;:::;I
pi; e

for all pi 2 Rn+; i = 1; : : : ; I
9>=>; :
Applying Lemma 1, the adjoint constraint
IX
i=1
xi  e is equivalent to
IX
i=1
hpi; xii 

max
i=1;:::;I
pi; e

for all pi 2 Rn+; i = 1; : : : ; I:
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Overall, (A) is the adjoint problem for (PD). Analogously, (A) is the adjoint problem
for (P). 2
Corollary 1 Let (pi)
I
i=1 solve (PD) and (xi)
I
i=1 solve its adjoint problem (A). Then, the
highest oer prices together with consumption bundles
max
i=1;:::;I
pi; (xi)
I
i=1

form a Gale equilibrium. Moreover, the i-th consumer's bundle x
(j)
i vanishes if his indi-
vidual price p
(j)
i is less than the highest oer price max
i=1;:::;I
p
(j)
i for good j, i.e.
x
(j)
i = 0 if p
(j)
i 6= max
i=1;:::;I
p
(j)
i ; i = 1; : : : ; I; j = 1; : : : ; n:
Proof:
Due to Theorem 4:
0  TLR

max
i=1;:::;I
pi

   (x1; : : : ; xI)
(15)
 TLR (p1; : : : ; pI)  (x1; : : : ; xI) = 0:
Hence, max
i=1;:::;I
pi solves (P). Due to the fact that (A) is the adjoint problem also for (P),

max
i=1;:::;I
pi; (xi)
I
i=1

is a Gale equilibrium according to Denition 2.
Further, (21) from Theorem 4 yields
 
IX
i=1
hpi; xii+

max
i=1;:::;I
pi; e

=  
IX
i=1

max
i=1;:::;I
pi; xi

 

max
i=1;:::;I
pi; e

= 0:
Thus,
IX
i=1

max
i=1;:::;I
pi   pi; xi

= 0;
or, equivalently,
max
i=1;:::;I
pi   p(j)i ; x(j)i

= 0; i = 1; : : : ; I; j = 1; : : : ; n:
The latter implies: x
(j)
i = 0 if p
j
i 6= max
i=1;:::;I
p
(j)
i . 2
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4 Algorithm for Fisher-Gale equilibrium
We describe how consumers may eciently adjust their individual prices (pi)
I
i=1 to arrive
at a Fisher-Gale equilibrium. This price adjustment corresponds to the quasi-monotone
subgradient method (SM) [18], which is described in Appendix for reader's convenience.
It is applied to the minimization of the total logarithmic revenue (PD):
min
p1;:::;pI2Rn+
TLR(p1; : : : ; pI):
Let i-th consumer choose a sequence of positive condence parameters fi[t]gt0, i =
1; : : : ; I. We consider the following iteration:
Algorithm for Fisher-Gale equilibrium (AFG)
1. Consumers determine their current excess supplies rpiTLR(p1[t]; : : : ; pI [t]):
a) i-th consumer computes an optimal bundle
xi(pi[t]) 2 arg max
xi 2 Xi
wi lnui(xi)  hpi[t]; xii ;
and the corresponding utility prices
qi(pi[t]) =
wi
ui (xi(pi[t]))
; i = 1; : : : ; I:
b) producers identify the highest oer prices
p[t] = max
i=1;:::;I
pi[t];
decide on supply shares
(i[t])
I
i=1 2M (p1[t]; : : : ; pI [t]) ;
and supply to the i-th consumer the bundle
i[t]  e; i = 1; : : : ; I:
d) i-th consumer computes his current excess supply
rpiTLR(p1[t]; : : : ; pI [t]) = i[t]  e  xi(pi[t]): (22)
2. Consumers accumulate their excess supplies
zi[t] = zi[t  1] +rpiTLR(p1[t]; : : : ; pI [t]); zi[ 1] = 0; i = 1; : : : ; I: (23)
3. Consumers compute their price forecasts w.r.t. the condence parameters i[t]
p+i [t] =

(j)
i
i[t]
( zi[t])+ ; i = 1; : : : ; I: (24)
where 
(j)
i are positive scaling coecients.
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4. Consumer update
pi[t+ 1] =
t+ 1
t+ 2
pi[t] +
1
t+ 2
p+i [t]; i = 1; : : : ; I (25)
by combining their previous prices with the forecasts. 2
First, we give an interpretation for the price forecast (24). Recall that zi[t] represents
the excess of producers' supply to i-th consumer over his demands for good j accumulated
up to time t. If z
(j)
i [t]  0, i.e. supply exceeds demand, then p+(j)i [t] = 0 for good j. In
case of z
(j)
i [t] < 0, the price forecast p
+(j)
i [t] is proportional to the accumulated individual
excess demand of i-th consumer with positive scaling coecients 
(j)
i . Here, i[t] plays
the role of a condence parameter. Namely, i[t]'s express to which extent consumers
take into account their excess demands while forecasting prices.
Secondly, let us interpret the price update (25):
pi[t+ 1] =
t+ 1
t+ 2
pi[t] +
1
t+ 2
p+i [t]:
Due to the latter, the next price is a convex combination of the previous price and the
price forecast. With time advancing, the proportion of the previous price becomes nearly
one, but the fraction of the forecast vanishes. Hence, we conclude that our price update
corresponds to a behavior of an experienced consumer. He credits his experience much
more than the current forecast. Further, from (25) we have
pi[t+ 1] =
1
t+ 2
 
pi[0] +
tX
r=0
p+i [r]
!
: (26)
The latter means that the prices generated by (AFG) can be viewed as historical aver-
ages of preceding forecasts. This averaging pattern is also quite natural to assume for
consumer's behavior while adjusting prices.
Next, we produce a feasible sequence for the adjoint problem (A) by averaging con-
sumption bundles from (AFG). Along with the prices f(p1[t]; : : : ; pI [t])gt0 generated
by algorithm (AFG), we consider the corresponding historical averages of consumption
bundles
xi[t]
def
=
1
t+ 1
tX
r=0
xi(p[r]) 2 Xi; i = 1; : : : ; I;
as well as the corresponding historical averages of utility prices
qi[t]
def
=
1
t+ 1
tX
r=0
qi(pi[r]) =
1
t+ 1
tX
r=0
wi
ui (xi(p[r]))
; i = 1; : : : ; I:
Next Lemma 2 estimates the dual gap for the minimization problem (PD) and its adjoint
problem (A) evaluated at the historical averages.
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For that, we set
TLR[t]
def
= TLR(p1[t]; : : : ; pI [t]);
[t]
def
= (x1[t]; : : : ; xI [t]) ;
F [t]
def
=
nX
j=1
 
IX
i=1
xi[t]
(j)   e
!2
+
:
TLR[t] is the value of the primal problem (PD), which is computed at the current prices
(p1[t]; : : : ; pI [t]). [t] is the value of the adjoint problem (A), which is computed at
historical averages (x1[t]; : : : ; xI [t]). F [t] is the quadratic penalty for violation of the
market feasibility constraint:
IX
i=1
xi[t]  e:
Further, we dene the upper and lower remainder terms bt and dt:
bt
def
=
1
t+ 1
IX
i=1
tX
r=0
1
i[r   1] ; i[ 1] = i[0];
dt
def
=
PI
i=1 i[t]
t+ 1
:
Lemma 2 Let the sequence fp1[t]; : : : ; pI [t]gt0 be generated by (AFG) with nondecreas-
ing condence parameters
i[t+ 1]  i[t]; t  0; i = 1; : : : ; I:
Then, for all t  0 it holds:
TLR[t]  TLR   C1dt  TLR[t]  [t] + C2
dt
F [t]  C3bt (27)
with some positive constants C1; C2; C3 > 0.
Proof:
The proof of Lemma 2 is based on the application of the quasi-monotone subgradient
method for nonsmooth convex minimization from [18]. Its proof is postponed to Appendix
for reader's convenience. 2
In order to arrive at the equilibrium price, consumers need to appropriately adjust
their condence parameters fi[t]gt0, i = 1; : : : ; I. Next Lemma 3 identies successful
adjustment strategies of condence parameters. Namely, the condence in the market
mechanism increases, but by decreasing increments. This ensures the convergence of the
remainder terms bt; dt from Lemma 2.
Lemma 3 Let nondecreasing condence parameters of the i-th consumer satisfy
i[t]  i[t  1]! 0; i[t]!1: (28)
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Then,
i[t]
t+ 1
! 0; and 1
t+ 1
tX
r=0
1
i[r   1] ! 0: (29)
Moreover, the achievable order of convergence in (29) is O

1p
t

.
Proof:
Since i[t] i[t 1]! 0, it holds by averaging that 1
t+ 1
tX
r=0
i[r] i[r 1]! 0. Thus,
1
t+ 1
i[t] =
1
t+ 1
tX
r=0
i[r]  i[r   1] + 1
t+ 1
i[ 1]! 0:
From i[t]!1 we have 1
i[t]
! 0, and also by averaging, 1
t+ 1
tX
r=0
1
i[r   1] ! 0:
The convergence of the order O

1p
t

can be achieved in (29) by choosing i[t] =
O(
p
t). In fact, we obtain:
1
t+ 1
tX
r=0
1
i[r   1] =
1
t+ 1

1
i[ 1] +
1
i[0]

+
1
t+ 1
tX
r=1
1p
r
:
Immediately, we see that 1t+1

1
i[ 1] +
1
i[0]

! 0 as of the order O  1t . Note that for
a convex univariate function (r), r 2 R, and integer bounds a; b, we have
bX
r=a
(r) 
b+1=2Z
a 1=2
(s)ds: (30)
Hence, we get
1
t+ 1
tX
r=1
1p
r
(30)
 1
t+ 1
t+1=2Z
1 1=2
1p
s
ds =
2
t+ 1
p
s
t+1=2
1=2
=
2
t+ 1
p
t+ 1=2 
p
1=2

! 0:
Here, the order of convergence is O

1p
t

. By assuming i[t] = O(
p
t), the convergence
i[t]
t+ 1
=
p
t
t+ 1
! 0 is also of the order O

1p
t

. 2
Remark 1 As in the proof of Lemma 3, nondecreasing condence parameters can be
written in the cumulative form:
i[t] =
tX
r=0
hi[r] + i[ 1]
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with incremental condences hi[t]  0. Then, the convergence condition (28) means that
incremental condences tend to zero and sum up to innity, i.e.
hi[t]! 0;
1X
t=0
hi[t] =1:
The latter coincides with the usual condition imposed on the step-sizes of the subgradient
method for nonsmooth convex minimization (e.g., [17]). However, in our setting hi[t] play
the role of incremental step-sizes. This gives rise to suppose that condence parameters
i[t] can be formed by consumers by incremental learning (cf. [23]). In fact, the i-th
consumer's condence in the price adjustment process, i[t], increases over time, however,
by decreasing increments hi[t]. The latter means that consumers properly slow down the
pace of their condence in the market mechanism. 2
Now, we are ready to prove the main convergence result for (AFG).
Theorem 5 Let consumers apply in (AFG) condence parameters satisfying
i[t]  i[t  1]! 0; i[t]!1; i = 1; : : : ; I:
Then, the sequence of highest oer prices, historical averages of consumption bundles and
of utility prices 
max
i=1;:::;I
pi[t]; (xi[t])
I
i=1 ; (qi[t])
I
i=1

from algorithm (AFG), converges to a Fisher-Gale equilibrium. The achievable rate of
convergence is of the order O

1p
t

.
Proof:
From Lemma 2 we obtain:
TLR[t]  TLR   C1dt  TLR[t]  [t] + C2
dt
F [t]  C3bt: (31)
This inequality is composed by the objective function TLR of the primal problem (PD),
computed at the current prices (p1[t]; : : : ; pI [t]), objective function  of its adjoint problem
(A), computed at historical averages (x1[t]; : : : ; xI [t]), and the quadratic penalty F [t] for
violation of the market feasibility constraint:
IX
i=1
xi[t]  e:
Due to the choice of condence parameters i[t], i = 1; : : : ; I, Lemma 3 provides:
bt ! 0; and dt ! 0:
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Using Theorem 4, (pi[t])
I
i=1 converges toward a solution of (PD), and (xi[t])
I
i=1 converges
toward a solution of (A) by order O

1p
t

. We apply Corollary 1 to conclude that the
sequence of highest oer prices together with historical averages of consumption bundles
max
i=1;:::;I
pi; (xi[t])
I
i=1

converge to a Gale equilibrium (cf. Denition 2). In order to get the additional conver-
gence to a Fisher-Gale equilibrium, we apply Theorem 1 (b). For that, it is enough to
show that the sequence of historical averages of utility prices
qi[t] =
1
t+ 1
tX
r=0
qi(pi[r]) =
1
t+ 1
tX
r=0
wi
ui (xi(pi[r]))
;
and the sequence of utility prices corresponding to the average consumption
wi
ui (xi[t])
; i = 1; : : : ; I;
have the same limit. First, due to the concavity of ui(), the inverse functions 1ui() ,
i = 1; : : : ; I, are convex. Hence,
wi
ui (xi[t])
=
wi
ui

1
t+1
Pt
r=0 xi(pi[r])
  1
t+ 1
tX
r=0
wi
ui (xi(pi[r]))
:
Further, from (13) we have
qi(pi[r])ui(xi(pi[r]))  hpi[r]; xi(pi[r])i  qi(pi[r])ui(yi)  hpi[r]; yii for all yi 2 Xi:
Setting yi = xi[t] and recalling qi(pi[r]) =
wi
ui(xi(pi[r]))
, we obtain
1
wi
hpi[r]; xi[t]  xi(pi[r])i+ 1  ui(xi[t])
ui(xi(pi[r]))
; i = 1; : : : ; I:
Averaging these inequalities and multiplying by wi, we get 
1
wi
1
t+ 1
tX
r=0
hpi[r]; xi[t]  xi(p[r])i+ 1
!
wi
ui(xi[t])
 1
t+ 1
tX
r=0
wi
ui(xi(pi[r]))
:
It remains to show that
1
t+ 1
tX
r=0
hpi[r]; xi[t]  xi(pi[r])i ! 0:
For that, we use that the sequence of prices converges, i.e. pi[t]! pi , i = 1; : : : ; I. Thus,
due to the averaging of consumption bundles, it holds 1t+ 1
tX
r=0
hpi[r]; xi[t]  xi(pi[r])i
 =
 1t+ 1
tX
r=0
hpi[r]  pi ; xi[t]  xi(pi[r])i
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 1
t+ 1
tX
r=0
kpi[r]  pi k kxi[t]  xi(pi[r])k ! 0:
The latter follows from the convergence kpi[t]  pi k ! 0 and the boundedness of the
consumption sets Xi, i = 1; : : : ; I. 2
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Appendix
Appendix is devoted to the proof of Lemma 2. For that, we rst present the quasi-
monotone subgradient method for nonsmooth convex minimization from [18]. As already
mentioned, the price adjustment (AFG) corresponds to this quasi-monotone subgradient
method. Using this fact, we prove Lemma 2 in the second part of Apppendix.
Quasi-monotone subgradient methods
We consider the following minimization problem:
min
x2X
f(x); (32)
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where X  Rn is a closed convex set with nonempty interior intX, and f is a convex
function on Rn. Moreover, let f be representable as a maximum of concave functions, i.e.
f(x) = max
a2A
(a) + '(x; a); (33)
where A  Rm is a closed convex set, '(; a) is a convex function on Rn for every a 2 A,
and , '(x; ) are concave functions on Rm for every x 2 X. Denote by a(x) one of the
optimal solutions of the maximization problem in (33). Then,
rf(x) def= rx'(x; a(x)) (34)
is a subgradient of f at x. Recall that for an arbitrary subgradient rf(x) at x 2 X of a
convex function f we have:
f(y)  f(x) + hrf(x); y   xi; y 2 X: (35)
Using the representation (33), we also have:
min
x2X
f(x) = min
x2X
max
a2A
[(a) + '(x; a)] = max
a2A

(a) + min
x2X
'(x; a)

:
The latter maximization problem
max
a2A

(a) + min
x2X
'(x; a)

(36)
is called adjoint for (32) with the adjoint variable a 2 A.
For the set X, we assume to be known a prox-function d(x).
Denition 4 d : X 7! R is called a prox-function for X if the following holds:
 d(x)  0 for all x 2 X and d(x[0]) = 0 for certain x[0] 2 X;
 d is strongly convex on X with convexity parameter one:
d(y)  d(x) + hrd(x); y   xi+ 1
2
ky   xk2; x; y 2 X; (37)
where k  k is a norm on Rn.
 Auxiliary minimization problem
min
x2X
fhz; xi+ d(x)g (38)
is easily solvable for z 2 Rn;  > 0.
As a simple consequence of Denition 4, we have for x 2 X:
d(x)  d(x[0]) + hrd(x[0]); x  x[0]i+ 1
2
kx  x[0]k2  1
2
kx  x[0]k2: (39)
For a sequence of positive parameters f[t]gt0, we consider the following iteration:
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Quasi-monotone Subgradient Method
1. Take a current subgradient rf(x[t]) = rx'(x[t]; a(x[t])).
2. Accumulate subgradients z[t] = z[t  1] +rf(x[t]), z[ 1] = 0.
3. Compute the forecast x+[t] = argmin
x2X
fhz[t]; xi+ [t]d(x)g.
4. Update by combining x[t+ 1] =
t+ 1
t+ 2
x[t] +
1
t+ 2
x+[t].
(SM)
Note that from (SM) we have
z[t] =
tX
r=0
rf(x[r]); x[t+ 1] = 1
t+ 2
 
x[0] +
tX
r=0
x+[r]
!
:
Next Theorem 6 is crucial for the convergence analysis of the quasi-monotone subgra-
dient method (SM). It estimates the dual gap for the minimization problem (32) and its
adjoint problem (36) evaluated at the historical averages.
For that, we dene the penalty term ht and the remainder term t, t  0, as follows:
ht(a)
def
=  min
x2X

'(x; a) +
[t]
t+ 1
d(x)

; a 2 A;
t
def
=
1
t+ 1
tX
r=0
1
2[r   1] krf(x[r])k
2
 ; [ 1] = [0]:
Here, k  k is the conjugate norm to k  k, i.e.
ksk def= max
s2Rn
fhs; xi : kxk  1g ; s 2 Rn: (40)
Further, we dene the average adjoint state
a[t]
def
=
1
t+ 1
tX
r=0
a(x[r]); t  0:
Note that a[t] 2 A, since A is convex.
Theorem 6 is motivated by the estimate sequence technique (e.g., Section 2.2.1 in [17])
and is due to [18]. We decided to present its proof for readers' convenience.
Theorem 6 (cf. [18]) Let the sequence fx[t]gt0 be generated by (SM) with nondecreas-
ing parameters
[t+ 1]  [t]; t  0: (41)
Then, for all t  0 it holds:
f(x[t])  (a[t]) + ht(a[t])  t: (42)
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Proof:
We dene the average linearization terms `t and  t for f :
`t(x)
def
=
tX
r=0
f(x[r]) + hrf(x[r]); x  x[r]i ;
 t
def
= min
x2X
f`t(x) + [t]d(x)g :
First, we show by induction that for all t  0 it holds:
f(x[t])   t
t+ 1
 t: (43)
Let us assume that condition (43) is valid for some t  0. Then,
 t+1 = min
x2X
f`t(x) + f(xt+1) + hrf(x[t+ 1]); x  x[t+ 1]i+ [t+ 1]d(x)g
(41)
 min
x2X
f`t(x) + [t]d(x) + f(x[t+ 1]) + hrf(x[t+ 1]); x  x[t+ 1]ig
(37)
 min
x2X

 t +
1
2
[t]
x  x+[t]2 + f(x[t+ 1]) + hrf(x[t+ 1]); x  x[t+ 1]i
(43)
 min
x2X

(t+ 1)f(x[t])  (t+ 1)t
+12[t] kx  x+[t]k2 + f(x[t+ 1]) + hrf(x[t+ 1]); x  x[t+ 1]i

(35)
 min
x2X

(t+ 1) [f(x[t+ 1]) + hrf(x[t+ 1]); x[t]  x[t+ 1]i]  (t+ 1)t
+12[t] kx  x+[t]k2 + f(x[t+ 1]) + hrf(x[t+ 1]); x  x[t+ 1]i

:
Since (t+ 2)x[t+ 1] = (t+ 1)x[t] + x+[t], we obtain
 t+1  (t+ 2)f(x[t+ 1])  (t+ 1)t
+min
x2X

rf(x[t+ 1]); x  x+[t]+ 1
2
[t]
x  x+[t]2
 (t+ 2)f(x[t+ 1])  (t+ 1)t   1
2[t]
krf(x[t+ 1])k2 :
= (t+ 2)f(x[t+ 1])  (t+ 2)t+1:
It remains to note that
 0 = min
x2X
ff(x[0]) + hrf(x[0]); x  x[0]i+ [0]d(x)g
(39)
 f(x[0])  0:
Now, we relate the term
 t
t+ 1
from (43) to the adjoint problem (36). It holds due to
convexity of '(; a), a 2 A:
f(x[r]) + hrf(x[r]); x  x[r]i =
(33);(34)
= (a(x[r])) + ' (x[r]; a(x[r])) + hrx' (x[r]; a(x[r])) ; x  x[r]i
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 (a(x[r]) + ' (x; a(x[r])) :
Hence, we obtain due to concavity of  and '(x; ), x 2 X:
`t(x) 
tX
r=0
(a(x[r]) + ' (x; a(x[r]))  (t+ 1) [ (a[t]) + ' (x; a[t])] :
Finally, we get
 t
t+ 1
 (a[t]) + min
x2X

' (x; a[t]) +
[t]
t+ 1
d(x)

= (a[t])  ht(a[t]): (44)
Altogether, (43) and (44) provide the formula (42). 2
Additionally, we need the following result on the quadratic penalty for general convex
optimization problems. From now on, let us consider the maximization problem
 def= max
a 2 A
f(a) j gl(a)  0; l = 1; : : : ; Lg ; (45)
where A  Rm is a closed convex set,  is a concave function, and gl(), l = 1; : : : ; L
are convex functions on Rm. We assume that the convex feasible set of the maximization
problem (45) has a Slater point (e.g., [20]). Let a be an optimal solution of (45) with
some Lagrange multipliers l , l = 1; : : : ; L, i.e.*
r(a) 
LX
l=1
lrgl(a); a   a
+
 0; for all a 2 A; (46)
l  0; gl(a)  0;
LX
l=1
l gl(a
) = 0: (47)
Lemma 4 It holds for  > 0:
max
a 2 A
"
(a)  
2
LX
l=1
(gl(a))
2
+
#
  + 1
2
LX
l=1
l :
Proof:
Due to the concavity of  and the convexity of gl, l = 1; : : : ; L, it holds for all a 2 A:
(a)  (a) + hr(a); a  ai ; (48)
gl(a)  gl(a) + hrgl(a); a  ai : (49)
We estimate
(a)
(48)
 (a) + hr(a); a  ai
(46)
  +
LX
l=1
l hrgl(a); a  ai
(49)
  +
LX
l=1
l (gl(a)  gl(a))
(47)
=  +
LX
l=1
l gl(a); a 2 A:
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Hence,
max
a 2 A
"
(a)  
2
LX
l=1
(gl(a))
2
+
#
  + max
a 2 A
LX
l=1
h
l gl(a) 

2
(gl(a))
2
+
i
  +
LX
l=1
max
bl 2 R
LX
l=1
h
l bl  

2
(bl)
2
+
i
=  +
LX
l=1
1
2
l :
2
Proof of Lemma 2
We start by proving that the price adjustment (AFG) is a variant of the quasi-monotone
subgradient method (SM). For that, it suces to show that
1) the price forecast (24) can be derived by means of Euclidean prox-functions,
2) TLR can be represented as the maximum of concave functions.
Firstly, we dene the Euclidean prox-functions:
di(p)
def
=
1
2
nX
j=1
1

(j)
i

p(j)
2
; i = 1; : : : ; I;
where 
(j)
i are positive scaling coecients. The corresponding norms in Denition 4 and
their conjugates according to (40) are
kpk2i =
nX
j=1
1

(j)
i

p(j)
2
; ksk2i =
nX
j=1

(j)
i

s(j)
2
; i = 1; : : : ; I:
For zi[t] 2 Rn; i[t] > 0 we consider the minimization problem as from step 3. in (SM):
min
p1;:::;pi2Rn+
(
IX
i=1
hzi[t]; pii+ i[t]di(pi)
)
: (50)
Its unique solution is the price forecast (24) as from step 3. in (AFG):
p
+(j)
i [t] =

(j)
i
i[t]

 z(j)i [t]

+
; j = 1; : : : ; n; i = 1; : : : ; I:
Secondly, it follows from (20) that the total logarithmic revenue is representable as a
maximum of concave functions:
TLR(p1; : : : ; pI) = max
xi 2 Xi
i = 1; : : : ; I
 (x1; : : : ; xI) + ' (p1; : : : ; pK ; x1; : : : ; xI) ;
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where
' (p1; : : : ; pI ; x1; : : : ; xi) =  
IX
i=1
hpi; xii+

max
i=1;:::;I
pi; e

:
Overall, we may apply Theorem 6 to get the following inequality:
TLR(p1[t]; : : : ; pI [t])   (x1[t]; : : : ; xI [t]) + ht (x1[t]; : : : ; xI [t])  t; (51)
where
ht (x1[t]; : : : ; xI [t]) =   min
p1;:::;pI2Rn+
(
' (p1; : : : ; pI ; x1[t]; : : : ; xI [t]) +
1
t+ 1
IX
i=1
i[t]di(pi)
)
;
t =
1
t+ 1
IX
i=1
tX
r=0
1
2i[r   1] krpiTLR(p1[t]; : : : ; pI [t])k
2
i :
We relate the penalty term ht to F [t] from Lemma 2. For that, we dene the Euclidean
prox-function
d(p)
def
=
1
2
nX
j=1

p(j)
2
:
It holds:
ht (x1[t]; : : : ; xI [t])    min
p2Rn+
(
' (p; : : : ; p; x1[t]; : : : ; xI [t]) +
1
t+ 1
IX
i=1
i[t]di(p)
)
=   min
p2Rn+
(*
p; e 
IX
i=1
xi[t]
+
+
1
t+ 1
IX
i=1
i[t]di(p)
)
   min
p2Rn+
(*
p; e 
IX
i=1
xi[t]
+
+
PI
i=1 i[t]
t+ 1
1
mini;j 
(j)
i
d(p)
)
=
t+ 1PI
i=1 i[t]
min
i;j

(j)
i
2
nX
j=1
 
IX
i=1
x
(j)
i [t]  e
!2
+
=
C2
dt
F [t];
where C2 = mini;j

(j)
i
2 .
Now, we relate the remainder term t to bt from Lemma 2. For that, let the constant
C3 > 0 bound the sequence of i-th consumer's excess supplies:
krpiTLR(p1[t]; : : : ; pI [t])k2i  2C3; t  0; i = 1; : : : ; I: (52)
The existence of C3 in (52) follows from the compactness of the consumption sets Xi,
i = 1; : : : ; I (see Section 2). Then, it holds:
t =
1
t+ 1
IX
i=1
tX
r=0
1
2i[r   1] krpiTLR(p1[t]; : : : ; pI [t])k
2
i  C3bt:
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Altogether, we estimated
ht (x1[t]; : : : ; xI [t])  C2
dt
F [t]; t  C3bt:
Substituting this into (51), we get the right-hand side of (27) in Lemma 2:
TLR[t]  [t] + C2
dt
F [t]  C3bt:
Now, we estimate the dual gap in Lemma 2 from below. For that, we apply Lemma 4
and Theorem 4 to obtain
[t]  C2
dt
F [t] =  (x1[t]; : : : ; xI [t])  C2
dt
nX
j=1
 
IX
i=1
x
(j)
i [t]  e
!2
+
 max
xi 2 Xi
i = 1; : : : ; I
(x1; : : : ; xI)  C2
dt
nX
j=1
 
IX
i=1
x
(j)
i   e
!2
+
 max
xi 2 Xi
i = 1; : : : ; I
IX
i=1
xi  e
(x1; : : : ; xI) +
dt
4C2
nX
j=1
p(j) = TLR + C1dt;
where C1 =
Pn
j=1 p
(j)
4C2
and p is an equilibrium price. Note that Lagrange multipliers
for the market feasibility constraint in the adjoint problem (A) coincide with minimizers
p of the total logarithmic revenue TLR.
Finally, we estimate
TLR[t]  [t] + C2
dt
F [t]  TLR[t]  TLR   C1dt:
This is the left-hand side of (27) in Lemma 2.
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